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        Ο.
             Yes, sir.
             And in looking at the negligence on page 5, I
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 3
    don't see that claim.
                  MR. DARNELL: You're talking about page 5
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    of?
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                  THE WITNESS: Of the seventh --
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                  MR. DARNELL: Of the seventh?
                  THE WITNESS: -- amended petition, which
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    seems to me to be clear that they were claiming --
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             Although they claim that they should have
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    undertaken this class action. So it would sound like to
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    me that there was a separate and completely different
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    claim.___
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        Q.
            (By Mr. Hayes) Well, would you look at page 6?
        Α.
            Yeah, maybe it's somewhere else.
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        Q. Look at page 6.
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                  MR. DARNELL: Of which one are we looking?
             Which one are we on, Gillespie?
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        Q.
            (By Mr. Hayes) On the -- no, no, on the
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    seventh amended.
        A. Okay.
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            We're going to call it the Beard suit versus
23
    the Gillespie.
       A. Page 6. Okay.
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        Q. Look at page 6 of the Beard suit.
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A. Okay.

Q. "Defendants Scherr and Gage were negligent and breached their fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs in ... they never conducted a hearing for the purposes of certification."

It's Item No. 6.

- A. Yeah, I see that.
- Q. Isn't that similar to what you're suggesting, "Defendants were negligent in that they failed to certify, or even attempt to certify, a class action suit"? Isn't that similar?
  - A. No, it's totally different.

No. 6 says that they breached their duty in that they never conducted a hearing for the purpose -- or the purposes of certification, that they never conducted a hearing. And No. 1 says they were negligent in that they failed to certify, or even attempt to certify, a class action. And in this particular case -- I do have a memory of the underlying case. It seems like there was some attempts to get a hearing to certify it by Scherr and Gage.

And that was -- actually, that was a big contention at the point that -- on they were saying they were negligent, breached their duty to plaintiffs in that they never conducted a hearing. As I recall, the

biggest problem was the defendants kept putting off the certification hearing in the underlying case.

And again, that's been a long time ago but I remember that. And that's why I think that in their -- it's not really a copycat pleading on that point, that's a different point, where they say they never conducted a hearing for the purposes of certification.

See, it was true that they never conducted a hearing. And whether they were negligent in not conducting it, that's a different issue. Now, and that they failed to certify, or even attempt to certify, a class action, those are two different things in my mind.

Q. Okay.

- A. You know, I mean I -- and again, there are some other issues here I have to look through. A lot of the others were the same.
- Q. Well, let me ask you this question: If you intervene in a lawsuit --
  - A. Okay.
- Q. -- and your claims are not at all related to the lawsuit in which you intervene, then your intervention is subject to being stricken, is it not?
  - A. No.
  - Q. In other words, if you're going to intervene in

a lawsuit, by your intervention you are suggesting that you have rights that are being adjudicated in an underlying lawsuit?

- A. Not necessarily. I've seen interventions in cases where they had the same defendant but they all wanted to go against that particular defendant. I've seen it where actually separate causes of actions are set up in interventions.
  - Q. Okay.

- A. I mean, you can envision that.
- Q. Let me ask this question.
- A. That's sort of a generic. But I would say normally a person intervenes because, you know, they're part of it like you've got two plaintiffs in a case. I just got an intervention in yesterday where we've got a -- the wife now has intervened. The two children filed a lawsuit, now the wife has intervened. And it all arose out of the same transaction. Okay?

But --

- Q. Okay.
- A. -- sometimes, especially in other types of cases, contract cases, things of that nature, there might be a series of different transactions in the case.
- Q. All right. Look at the part of the lawsuit that discusses the facts on page 2 of the Beard suit --

A. Okay. . 1 Q. -- and background facts that's on page 3 of the 2 intervention. Okay. I can't see 3. It's got a line through Α. it, but I assume it's -- is it 00451? 5 Q. 00413. 6 On page 3? 7 Α. Yeah, page -- yeah. 8 Ο. 3. And on the Gillespie it's 00451? 9 Α. No. No. On --10 Ο. MR. DARNELL: I think we're on the 11 12 wrong --Q. (By Mr. Hayes) On the plea in intervention 13 it's 00413. 14 Okay. I got that. 15 Α. Okay? And on the other suit it's 00424. 16 17 MR. DARNELL: I think you're looking at the wrong pleading, Don. 18 Okay. Let's get something else. 19 Α. 20 (By Mr. Hayes) Seventh. You're supposed to be looking at the seventh amended. 21 I'm on the fifth. 22 MR. DARNELL: Exhibit 17. 23

(By Mr. Hayes) Go to seven, the seventh.

I'm on the fifth.

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Ο.

That may be the problem that you're having in terms of the analysis that you did, to some extent, but that's fine.

Let's go ahead. I'd like you to compare --

- A. No, I had this one earlier. I had the same one earlier.
  - Q. Okay. That's fine.
  - A. I'm sorry. I just flipped it over.
- Q. No problem. No problem.
- 11 A. Okay.

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- 12 Q. Look at facts on 00424 Bates number.
- 13 A. 424. Okay.
- Q. And 00413 Bates number.
- A. (Witness complies.)
- 16 Q. Okay.
- 17 A. Okay.
- Q. It would appear to me that they all are an outgrowth of the way Mr. Scherr handled Cause No.

  88-7707, Dr. Walter Rhodes, et al., versus American

  General Fire and Casualty, et al., in the 243rd Judicial

  District Court of El Paso County, Texas, hereinafter

  referred to as Cause No. 88-7707. And I believe that --
  that language appears in both pleadings, does it

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The -- it starts off in both period -- both
    Α.
pleadings, okay, if you go all the way down through El
Paso County, hereinafter referred to as cause number
such and such. Okay?
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And then on the seventh amended petition it continues on, "Defendant Scherr entered into an agreement with Defendant Gage, " et cetera, et cetera. Okay? I don't see -- that's different in the intervention.

- Well, the focus --Ο.
- Is that first sentence? Α.
- Yeah, my focus --Ο.
  - That's correct. Α.
- -- is that they're both --Q.
- 15 Α. That's the same thing.
- -- related to the same. And that's what we Ο. have been calling --17
- 18 They both start out --Α.
- -- the underlying lawsuit. Is that correct? 19 Q.
- 20 Α. Right.

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- Okay. 21 Q.
  - They both start out by in effect describing the underlying lawsuit, and then they go on -- in the intervention -- it -- they obviously didn't copy that part of it. They did their own -- they typed up their

own deal. 1

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- Do you know whether or not the intervenors were 2 all chiropractors? 3
  - I have no memory of that one way or the other. Α.
  - Q. Okay.
    - I can go back and look at the intervenors and sees what it says.
      - Well, no, no. I just --Q.
      - I don't -- just don't --Α.
- This isn't a test. 10 Q.
- Yeah. Α. 11
- I'm just trying to ask a question. 12 Q.
- I just don't remember, to be honest with you. 13 Α.
- That's fine. Q. 14
- They probably were, but you know, I don't have 15 any recollection. 16
  - Do you think the intervention is complaining about the way Mr. Scherr handled the Rhodes case, the underlying case, or Mr. Scherr and Mr. Gage and
- Mr. Gage's law firm? 20
  - Sure. The causes of action were negligence and somehow they caused the intervenors' damages.
    - Q. Okay.
- A. And they say failure to certify the class action case, which was the underlying case, and they 25

were negligent in their misrepresentation -- or their representation of the class and that they settled it.

Yeah, it -- it -- they're complaining about the handling of the underlying case.

- Q. When you used the term earlier "the same transaction" in the explanation of the intervention you received recently in your law firm here, earlier --
  - A. Right.

- Q. -- in this deposition, both the intervention and -- in other words, the Gillespie intervention and the malpractice case, or we've been calling it the Beard or the legal malpractice case -- both of those are associated with the same underlying transaction, meaning Mr. Scherr's, Mr. Gage, Mr. Gage's law firm's handling of the Rhodes case, or the underlying case. Isn't that correct?
- A. I would say they both go to the handling of the underlying case by Mr. Scherr and Mr. Gage.
  - O. Okay. Now --
- A. What specifics, again, you'd have to go back to the pleadings to look at that to see what -- the specifics they were complaining about.
- Q. And I assume you could lay the pleadings side by side and someone could analyze that pleading?
  - A. Well, it would take a few -- more than just a

- couple minutes looking at them because --
- Q. No, no, no, no, no.
  - A. -- they're lengthy.
- Q. We're misspeaking. I'm saying somebody could undertake that task from the standpoint of doing a legal analysis of the case. It's doable?
  - A. Sure.

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- Q. Okay. That's my only question.
- A. Yeah. No problem.
- Q. Okay. We're not going to do it here today.

MR. DARNELL: That makes all of us happy.

MR. HAYES: I agree.

- Q. (By Mr. Hayes) Exhibit No. 21. Why don't you tell me what Exhibit No. 21 is?
- A. That's a suit approaching trial report that we send in just to update status with recommendations and tell them about what's going on.

(Exhibit 22 was marked.)

- Q. (By Mr. Hayes) Okay. And we have another one of these letters from the insurance company to Mr. Scherr. Tell me what that is, again just generically, Exhibit No. 22.
- A. Well, it talks about a change from The Home

  Insurance now to Risk Enterprise Management. They -
  apparently there was a purchase of a carrier and so they

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formed a new company called Risk Enterprise Management Limited, known as REM, and Mr. Scherr is being advised of this by -- I guess it was by Oscar Allen -- he's now with REM and telling that it's been changed. And then -- I believe then they go on to talk about a reservation of rights, again generically.
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- Q. Dealing with the seventh amended pleading?
- A. Well, it -- I -- apparently it was -- I don't know because the other one --
  - Q. May I see it?
- A. -- the other one was generated after I had sent another pleading to them, you know.

And did you have a letter where I sent the seventh amended pleading to them and then they followed up with that?

- Q. You know what? I don't have it. My problem is --
- 18 | A. Okay.

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- O. -- I don't have it.
- A. That's all right.
  - Q. I'm sure you did, and I don't have it.

Now, did this matter go to trial?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And is -- am I correct in assuming -- and I've got a time line here, but am I correct in

assuming that it goes to trial in October of 1995?

A. I have no clue. As we sit here today, I don't have any records to tell me that.

(Exhibits 23 and 24 were marked.)

Q. (By Mr. Hayes) Okay. There -- I have been told that on October the 5th of 1995 the trial began, and I am going to hand you a document which I am going to mark -- unfortunately it doesn't have a date on it -- the 20 -- No. 23. But I'm going to give you Exhibit No. 24, let you look at the two of them --

(Exhibit 25 was marked.)

Q. (By Mr. Hayes) -- and No. 25 and see if we can reconstruct roughly the time that the trial occurred and what happened.

So I'll let you look at 23, 24, 25. I'd like you to tell us what they are first and then see if they help you explain to us what happened in terms of the trial.

# (Exhibit 26 was marked.)

- Q. (By Mr. Hayes) And then I'm going to give you No. 26 as well because I think this goes with that grouping of documents. But if I'm wrong, you tell me I'm wrong.
- A. Okay. Well, 23 was the charge of the court. This is what -- it's the form that the court uses to

charge the jury. They're required to use verbatim a special charge, instructions that are given to the jury, and together with that there are special issues or questions that go to the jury, questions that are ones that the lawyers and the judge get together to try to resolve to see how it's going to go to the jury.

Sometimes as a defense lawyer we get a charge that we like, and sometimes the plaintiff gets the charge that they like. Sometimes we both get charges neither one of us likes, but it's something you try to work out.

Of course, once the judge comes up with the charge, if you don't like it then you object to it to protect the record, if you think he's wrong in the way he's charging it. But basically what a charge has, the questions are questions that pertain to liability, questions that pertain to damages, and these are questions in the form of special issues that a jury answers to -- for the court to reach a verdict.

Q. Okay.

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- A. Or a judgment.
- Q. Now, did this -- can you give me a time frame?

  I mean, can we say October of '95, based on the release,
  in terms of when this case was tried?
  - A. Yeah, I think October of '95 would be a pretty

accurate estimate.

- Q. And again I'm not trying to put words in your mouth because Mr. Darnell --
  - A. Go ahead.
  - O. -- would object to it.
  - A. He won't care.
- Q. But the point I'm making is the trial began and the trial continued through the jury receiving a charge and going back into a room and answering questions. Is that correct?
  - A. That's correct.

Now, this case was -- as I recall, I believe it was bifurcated.

- O. What does that mean?
- A. That means that the jury would come up with questions and answers but if those questions were answered a certain way that the jury might be sent back to answer additional questions pertaining, for example, to other damages.
- Q. Okay. What factually happened in this particular case after the jury came back and answered the questions that it did in Exhibit No. --

Where is the charge?

- A. The charge is No. 23.
- Q. Okay. In No. 23? What happened next,

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factually speaking? Just get me through it chronologically to Exhibit No. 24. Something had to happen in between 23 and 24.
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- A. Well, I think the jury came back with their answers and the answers indicated that the counterclaims were washed out. The jury found liability in the case and --
  - Q. Against Dr. Scherr and Dr. Gage?
  - A. Against Dr. --
- MR. DARNELL: Mr. Scherr.
- 11 A. Mister.

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- 12 Q. (By Mr. Hayes) Excuse me. Mr. Scherr?
- 13 A. Mr. Scherr.
  - Q. Dr. Gage?
- 15 | A. Dr. Gage.
- MR. DARNELL: Mr. Gage.
- 17 Q. (By Mr. Hayes) Dr. Gage's law firm?
- 18 A. And they found damages.
- Q. All right. And did something occur to give rise to Exhibit No. 24?
  - A. Yes. After the charge and after we got these answers, the case then was settled before it went back for further adjudication of any other issues.
    - Q. Who negotiated the settlement?
- A. I don't remember.

- Q. Well, do you have a memory of negotiating the settlement yourself?
  - A. No.

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- Q. Did Mr. Darnell participate in negotiating the settlement?
  - A. I don't remember.
  - Q. Did Mr. Scherr negotiate the settlement?
- A. I just -- I really don't remember. I've got to be honest with you. I think there were some discussions. I was involved. I remember talking to Mr. Allen about this. I remember talking to Ms. Georges. I remember talking to Mr. Scherr. But I don't remember how we finally put it to bed, to be honest with you.
  - Q. Okay.
- 16 A. And Wilhelm was there. He was involved in the 17 trial.
- 18 Q. Wilhelm was Mr. Scherr's personal lawyer?
- 19 A. Yes. He was --
  - Q. And when I say that, I mean he wasn't paid by The Home Insurance Company or its successor insurance company?
- A. To be honest with you, I don't know if they
  paid him or not. I didn't see his bills, if he sent
  them to The Home -- and I don't know what arrangement

- Jim may have had with Wilhelm vis-a-vis The Home
  Insurance, but I assume that Jim was paying his bills.
  - Q. Okay.
  - A. Yeah.

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- Q. So the matter was settled?
- A. It was settled.
- Q. Okay. And I assume that -- does the release say where the moneys came from, or does it merely just say moneys are paid?
- A. Well, let's see. The release speaks for itself. Let's --
  - Q. Well, why don't you look at your letter which follows that, Exhibit No. -- is that 25?
    - A. Yeah.
- Q. Does that help your memory in terms of where the money came from?
- A. No. It just says that Home paid 50,000 of it.

  I don't know where the rest of it came from.
- Q. Would you feel safe in assuming that some of it came from Mr. Scherr and some of it came from Mr. Gage?
- A. No, I wouldn't. I don't know who paid what.

  22 I'll be honest with you.
- 23 Q. All right.
- A. There's no -- you may have another letter or something like that, but I can't recall. I don't have

anything either. If you had something to refresh my memory on that, who paid what. I recall that there was money in the registry of the court, for example.

Q. Okay.

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- A. And so I know a portion of it came out of the registry of the court, or at least I thought it did.
- Q. Explain the money in the registry of the court and how that fit into the overall lawsuit, if you can.
  - A. I can't.
  - Q. Okay.
- A. I don't remember how that got there. But I think at some point in time there must have been some settlement negotiations and somebody agreed let's just escrow the money and just see if we can work something out.
- 16 Q. Okay.
- 17 A. And I don't even remember how much it was.
- Q. All right. What is the next exhibit after your letter by number?
  - A. 22, 24, 23, 24.
  - Well, 26 is here. That's the ninth amended petition. Is that it?
  - O. Where is 25?
- A. I'm just doing my old document shuffle we've been doing all day. Here it is, 25.

- O. What's 25?
- A. That's the letter that -- the \$50,000 letter --
- Q. Okay.

- A. -- where Home's portion, they paid 50,000.
- Q. Okay. What is 26?
- A. 26 is the ninth amended petition.
- Q. Well, why would you file a ninth amended petition after the case has already been settled?

  MR. DARNELL: Object to the form.
- Q. (By Mr. Hayes) If you know? And I'd like you to compare and contrast that last pleading with whatever pleading we have here that was a live pleading before the ninth. We don't have the eighth. Look at the seventh, which is exhibit number something. What exhibit number is --
- A. It's No. 17.
- 17 | O. Okay.
- 18 A. Okay. I'm looking at the two.
  - Q. Compare 17 and 26 and tell me, if you can, why would someone after the case is settled, releases have been signed, why would they file a ninth amended petition in the underlying -- or in the -- not the underlying, in the legal malpractice case or the Beard case?
    - A. Well, the case was settled on -- let's see the

date. The 25th of October is when it was signed off on by -- no, that's the dismissal. Okay. The case was dismissed on the 25th of October. The 26th of October is when the -- 25th of October was when the plaintiffs signed off on the release. Okay?

- Q. And what's the date of the ninth amended?
- A. The ninth amended -- can't tell -- it was -- I don't know.
  - Q. Well, go to the certificate of service.
- A. Well, I didn't -- oh, down at the bottom. 31st of October. Okay.

So it was filed -- it was done after the settlement, and it was probably agreed upon that they could do that if they wanted to. We didn't care. It was actually filed after the court dismissed the case, though. I thought that was interesting. Most lawyers would hold off on it.

- Q. Hold off on the dismissal till they filed it?
- A. Yeah. Yeah.
- Q. Well --

- A. I don't know if I would --
- Q. -- why would any lawyer want to do that, if you know? And if you don't know and it just would be rank speculation, that's fine. But if you have a sense based upon your many years of practice as to why that

occurred, I would like you to answer the question.

A. I mean, it would be pure speculation why Martie Georges did it, to be honest with you. But I know there are lawyers that do that. They like to amend the pleadings and take out the allegations of either intentional acts where they're not dealing with a punitive award or punitive settlement so that -- they seem to think that there's not the same tax consequences.

Q. Okay.

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A. In this case, however, where the awards were for money damages and for payment of bills and things, I'm not sure that that was an issue anyhow because they weren't suing for personal injuries, per se, they were suing for losses that were actually business losses, business revenue, things of that nature, so it was probably going to be taxable anyhow.

So again, that -- you know, if you think about it, in a personal injury case they do that, but this was a different situation. And I don't make any determination as to the taxableness of the award.

That's up to the plaintiffs and their lawyer.

- Q. And the IRS?
- A. And the IRS.
- Q. I'm going to hand you --

MR. DARNELL: Sometimes only up to the 1 2 IRS. THE WITNESS: Yeah. 3 (Exhibit 27 was marked.) 4 (By Mr. Hayes) I'm going to hand you a first 5 Q. amended plea in intervention. 6 Α. Okay. (Exhibit 28 was marked.) 8 (By Mr. Hayes) And I'm going to hand you 9 Q. Exhibit No. 28 and ask you whether or not you were 10 defending Mr. Scherr in that intervention suit? 11 12 Α. I was. Okay. And what is -- so what is that amended Q. 13 pleading in the intervention? Did the intervention not 14 15 get settled at the time that the other lawsuit --No, it did not. 16 -- was settled? 17 No. The judge severed the intervention when we 18 19 tried the case. 20 What does that mean when the judge severs intervention? 21 He just -- it severs and says, "Hey, you guys 22 have your own case later. We're going to try this case 23 24 now." 25 And his reasoning was that there had been

a tremendous amount of discovery done without the intervenors in the case and he figured that there was going to have to be more inter- -- more discovery done for their case, and I think he even told us that. And so, as a result, he said, "They can do it later, and I'm leaving the bench and you-all can -- somebody else can handle this."

- Q. All right. What is Exhibit No. 28?
- A. That's a letter from -- from REM, from Oscar Allen to REM (sic).
- Q. And what is the general purpose of that letter?

  Is it a reservation of rights/acknowledgment letter?
- A. Again the letter speaks for itself, but let's see. Let me read it and see.

Just told him from now on he's on his own.

Q. Pardon?

- A. They said from now on you're on your own. We've paid our money is what it says.
  - Q. We have exhausted the limits of the policy?
  - A. Well, they say they paid --
- Q. I mean, I'm not saying that's factually accurate. I'm saying is that what the letter says?
- A. Well, the letter, like I say, speaks for itself. It says they paid \$203,639.20 of defense costs and lost payment so they were not going to pay any more

money.

(Exhibit 29 was marked.)

- Q. (By Mr. Hayes) Okay. Now, Exhibit No. 29, is that an affidavit of yours? And I should have handed that to you earlier when we were talking about when the case started.
  - A. Yeah, that's my affidavit.
- Q. Under what circumstances was that affidavit required?
  - A. I have no clue.
- Q. Well, I don't either. I was hoping you could tell me.
- A. I'd just be speculating. It's been a long time, but I would speculate on the basis it might have had something to do with the -- a subsequent motion for summary judgment that we filed in the --
- 17 Q. Intervention?
- 18 A. -- intervention case.
- 19 | Q. Okay.
  - A. I mean, that affidavit's to do that because I'm attaching a copy of this agreed motion for dismissal, and you know, maybe we had to show that as part of it. Again, that may have been something my law department people and the people that handled the motion for summary judgment asked me to do. But everything I say

- in there I believe is correct.
- Q. Well, I wasn't --
- A. Yeah.

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- Q. -- trying to take umbrage with what you said.
- A. No, I understand.
- Q. I was just trying to get a sense of why it was done.
- A. It seems somewhat -- it's rather neutral. And maybe it's for authentication purposes, you know, but it doesn't really say that.
  - (Exhibits 30, 31 and 32 were marked.)
  - Q. (By Mr. Hayes) I'm going to hand you --
  - A. Or does it? Wait a second.
- Q. -- Exhibits 30, 31 and 32 and ask you whether you have ever seen or participated in the developing of these, which I would indicate to you are affidavits of your client, Mr. Scherr? And I believe I have them in order, chronologically in order.
  - A. Okay.
- Q. Did you participate in the preparation of those affidavits or -- and did you participate in the legal endeavor that would call for those affidavits as you sit here today?
- A. You're talking about the --
- 25 O. The Scherr affidavits.

A. I don't know. I really don't remember.

I know I participated in mine. Again, I would just have to surmise or guess that these are affidavits that may have been done in connection with our handling of the underlying -- the Gillespie matter.

- Q. Okay. Do the facts related in Mr. Scherr's affidavit -- are they consistent with your memory of the facts on those issues? And I'm not trying to look for a disagreement. I assume you're going to say you're in agreement.
  - A. Okay. Let me see.

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- Q. But I just want to make sure that you have an opportunity --
- A. I believe he was over the age of 18, of sound mind, and I think -- he's an attorney.
  - Q. Which exhibit are you looking at?
- A. I'm looking at 31.
  - Q. Okay. If there's something there that you're either unable to confirm or you disagree with, I'd like you to tell me.
  - A. To be honest with you, I just -- it's been so long I just don't know if I can agree with or disagree with any of it in here. But generally it sounds like it was correct.
    - Q. Okay. Would you look at the next one?

- A. (Witness complies.)
- Q. And then look at the last one. The same request.

You have three affidavits.

- A. Oh, I'm sorry.
- Q. Would you again enunciate the numbers of the three affidavits, or say them for us?
  - A. Well, 30 -- there's 30, 31 and 32.
- Q. All righty.

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- A. Okay. Let me look at them real quick.
- Q. Sure. I mean, some of the same issues are
  discussed in your affidavit; and so, I assume if you can
  look at your affidavit and your affidavit's accurate --
- A. 30 is correct. I mean it looks like it tracks

  my affidavit.
- 16 Q. All right.
- A. Now, whether that was for authentication or what, I just don't remember.
- 19 Let's see. And the next one, 31 ...
- Q. And is 31 the one that explains how Marjorie
  21 Georges got involved with --
  - A. Yes.
- Q. -- Mr. Beard, Bailey and Petrosky?
- 24 A. Yeah. And again --
- Q. Does that seem to comport with your memory

of --1 2 See --Α. -- the facts as you learned them? 3 Q. As far as I know, yeah. Everything I got, you 4 know, secondhand, but as I recall that sounds like it. 5 6 I just don't remember whether her case was settled -- I mean whether she dismissed it after Jim Scherr settled 7 the cases or before. I just don't have any memory of 8 9 that one way or the other. Okay. 10 Q. So I couldn't really tell you. 11 Α. And it strikes me that he is making an effort 12 Q. in this affidavit -- is that 32 we're talking about? 13 Α. I'm on 32 now. 14 Okay. And in affidavit No. 32 it strikes me 15 16 that what he's doing is setting up the position for the Gillespie motion for summary judgment. 17 MR. DARNELL: Wait. This is -- 32 is the 18 19 third one. 20 MR. HAYES: I'm sorry. MR. DARNELL: 31 is the longer one. 21 THE WITNESS: Long one. 31 is the long 22 23 one. 24 MR. HAYES: 31 is the long one? 25 THE WITNESS: Yeah.

MR. DARNELL: And 32 is the last one. 1 MR. HAYES: Okay. 30 is the short one. 2 3 30 is --MR. DARNELL: May 3rd. 4 MR. HAYES: May the 3rd. 5 Okay. Thank you. Let me restate it, 6 then. 7 In 31 it strikes me that he is Q. (By Mr. Hayes) 8 9 setting up factually the position that he never had an attorney-client relationship with intervenors who were 10 potential class members, according to him, but not his 11 direct clients. Is that how you see 31? 12 "Because the Rhodes" -- I'm reading from 13 the one, two, three -- fourth paragraph. "Because the 14 Rhodes case was never certified as a class action, I 15 never represented any putative class members who had no 16 written contract of employment with me. Until 17 certification of the class occurred, I did not represent 18 19 unnamed members of a putative class in the Rhodes case who never executed a contract with me." 20 So he's saying the intervenors are a group 21 of persons who say they had a legal relationship with me 22

of persons who say they had a legal relationship with me as their attorney but because of the law in Texas they were not my client because I didn't have a contract with them and there was no class certification. Is that what

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that is suggesting? 1 I mean, that's what it suggests. 2 Okay. Is that not the basis for the motion for 3 Ο. summary judgment? 4 A. You know, you were talking about that earlier, 5 and I just don't remember the basis for the summary 6 . 7 judgment. Well, let me --Ο. 8 9 I'd have to look at the summary judgment. Let me hand you the appellate court decision in 10 Gillespie --11 A. Okay. Uh-huh. 12 (Exhibit 33 was marked.) 13 14 (By Mr. Hayes) -- 33, and see whether or not Ο. that appears to you -- what is 33? 15 33 is an appellate court decision from the 16 17 court of appeals. MR. DARNELL: In fact, why don't we 18 take -- once he identifies it, why don't we take a 19 break? 20 THE WITNESS: 33. 21 22 MR. DARNELL: He's going to read this. 23 MR. HAYES: Okay. Sure. MR. DARNELL: Let's let him read it. 24 THE WITNESS: Yeah, that's fine. 25

MR. HAYES: Not a problem. I agree. 1 MR. DARNELL: You can go ahead and get it 2 identified, if you want to, and then we can just take a 3 break for a few minutes. MR. HAYES: Yeah, not a problem. 5 (By Mr. Hayes) Identify it and then we'll take Q. 6 a break so you can read it off the record. I think 7 Mr. Darnell wanted you to read it --Oh, it's No. 33. That's fine. No, I can just 9 10 sit here and read it and then we can go back on the 11 record. THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Want to go off the 12 13 record? THE WITNESS: Yeah. 14 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record at 15 twenty-three minutes before 12:00 p.m. 16 (Break taken.) 17 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going back on the 18 record at seven minutes before 12:00 p.m. 19 (By Mr. Hayes) Mr. Hudgins, we've taken a 20 21 brief recess and I believe you have looked at Exhibit 22 No. --23 Α. 33. -- 33? 24 Ο. I have. 25 Α.

- Q. What is Exhibit No. 33?
- A. That's an opinion by the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District in Houston, Texas.
  - Q. And what case does that opinion deal with?
  - A. This is on the Gillespie case.
  - O. On the intervention?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. And do you remember earlier when I asked you to refer to one of Mr. Scherr's affidavits? And I believe it's the longer affidavit.
  - A. Yes.
- Q. And I asked you whether or not -- part of the purpose of that affidavit appeared to me to be making the factual position that he did not have a contractual relationship, attorney-client relationship, with persons who were potential class members in an uncertified class?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Is that issue in the appellate opinion on Gillespie, Exhibit 33?
  - A. I think it was a side issue, yes.
- Q. Okay. What -- did the court, the underlying trial court in the Gillespie intervention, rule on a motion for summary judgment filed by lawyers on Mr.
- 25 | Scherr's behalf?

1 A. Yes.

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- Q. And what did the court rule?
- A. They granted summary judgment on behalf of Mr. Scherr.
  - Q. And what does that mean legally?
- A. That there are no issues of fact and as a matter of law Mr. Scherr was entitled to a summary -- or a judgment in the case.
  - Q. In other words, he won?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And that was appealed?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. It was appealed by the losing side, the --
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. -- chiropractors?
- 16 A. Yes.
- Q. And -- the intervenors?
- 18 A. That's correct.
- 19 Q. I said "chiropractors," and that's not an 20 established issue.
- A. They were no longer intervenors. Then they
  became the plaintiffs in the case because the case had
  been severed; and so, they were the only parties.
- Q. All right. And what did the appellate court do with the appeal from the plaintiffs in the severed

- Gillespie case when it --
- A. They --

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- Q. -- received it?
  - A. They affirmed the underlying trial court.
  - Q. And was the matter dismissed at that point?
- A. No. I believe the appellees filed an application for a writ of error to the Texas Supreme Court.
  - Q. And then what happened?
  - A. And I don't believe the writ was granted.
- 11 O. And then was the case dismissed?
- 12 A. The case was over.
- 13 Q. Okay. And --
- 14 A. The judgment became final at that point.
- Q. Okay. And I believe no money -- was any money

  paid by Mr. Scherr to the intervening Gillespie

  plaintiffs to your knowledge?
- 18 A. I don't know.
- 19 Q. Well, given --
- 20 A. We did not --
- 21 Q. Given the procedure --
- A. -- have it at the end. There was another firm
  that took over after the court of appeals handled the
  case. We turned over the case to an Austin firm because
  that's where the supreme court's located, and an Austin

firm handled it at that point. I don't think that anything was paid, but again --

- Q. Well, logically speaking, if the -- if a summary judgment is filed and a summary -- or if a motion for summary judgment is filed in a trial court, the trial court grants it, it is appealed to the appellate court, the appellate court sustains it, it is appealed to the supreme court and the supreme court refuses to take the case, the effect then is that the plaintiffs lose. Is that correct?
- A. That's correct.

- Q. It would be highly unlikely for Mr. Scherr to volunteer to pay plaintiffs that have lost under those circumstances, wouldn't it?
- A. I understand. That's what -- it would not make much sense, but on the other hand, people do a lot of different things.
- Q. I understand. Your point is you just factually don't know the answer to that question?
  - A. I do not know the answer to that question. I can speculate that nothing was paid.
    - Q. Okay. Have you understood my questions?
  - A. I have.
- Q. Have I given you a reasonable opportunity to answer them?

A. You have.

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- Q. Do you think that we have fairly well and accurately laid out the procedural, factual history of this case as you understand it?
  - A. Based on an old man's memory, as best I can do.
- Q. Well, is there anything -- for the record and for the benefit of the jury, is there anything that you can think of that I have left out that is, to your mind, important that you need to raise and insert chronologically in this matter?
  - A. Nothing that I can recall at this time.

MR. HAYES: Okay. I will pass the witness to Mr. Darnell and I'll thank you for your time.

### EXAMINATION

### BY MR. DARNELL:

Q. Mr. Hudgins, I just have a couple of questions and then I'll reserve most everything I've got.

Just trying to summarize these two lawsuits, one the Beard case and the other the Gillespie case, is the Beard case complaining about the split of moneys from settlements?

- A. That's what it appeared to me to be.
- Q. And did the Gillespie case complain about the class never being certified?
  - A. Well, again, I looked at that pleading and

that's what it said. The Gillespie intervention indicated that.

MR. DARNELL: Okay. I'll reserve the rest of my questions.

### FURTHER EXAMINATION

## BY MR. HAYES:

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- Q. Let me ask this question of you: Number one, if you were -- you told me initially that you did not sit down here today and analyze the Gillespie intervention pleading and the Beard intervention pleading to determine the degree to which they were copycats of each other. Is that correct?
- A. Right. What I told you is that number one claim, negligence claim, it sort of jumped out at me.

  And when I saw that, you know, I was looking back at the other pleading.

They had a lot of the same issues, but generally speaking, I think the claim that Martie Georges' clients were making had to do with the money that we talked about. I remember now that it was put in the registry of the court. They were fighting over the money that was put in the registry of the court.

Q. Was there also not some complaints by the Beard plaintiffs that expenses were not properly accounted for?

A. Yes.

- Q. Okay. And the complaint by the Gillespie intervenors, slash, plaintiffs, that particular complaint was found by the appellate court to be without merit, isn't that correct, because there was no attorney-client privilege between them and Mr. Scherr?
- A. Yeah. What I think they said, that putative class members are not the attorney's clients until the case is certified.
- Q. Is that another way of saying that the Gillespie intervenors, slash, plaintiffs have no standing to sue Mr. Scherr as an attorney for any of the conduct by him in the underlying lawsuit?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. When you discussed the issue of class certification, I just want to make sure I understand your point. Is it your point that in one pleading there may be a complaint that there was never an attempt to certify the class and in another pleading there may be a complaint that while you may have tried to certify the class you didn't get the job done? Is that the nuance that you were giving me?
  - A. I think that's about it, yeah.
- Q. But it all boils down to whether or not a class was certified, doesn't it, ultimately?

A. Well, the original plaintiffs, Beard, they were complaining about moneys that came about as a result of the settlements prior to a certification. Okay?

It sounded like to me that the Gillespies were concerned -- the Gillespie plaintiffs, the intervenors, were concerned that, failing to get the case certified, they didn't receive any moneys because if it had been certified then there would have been money that would have gone to all the class members, potential class members, and they didn't get anything.

And going back to what happened in the underlying case, when we severed the case the judge indicated that, you know, they could try their case later but we were trying the case in this case over the moneys that were in the registry of the court and based on what the discovery had been done through that point.

- Q. Let me ask this question, though. It strikes me that in the Gillespie intervention those plaintiffs kind of got cut off at the knees before they really got well into the race because Mr. Scherr said, "You were not my client. I owed you no duty as a matter of law. Forget what I did." Isn't that what factually occurred?
  - A. I believe so.

Q. If Mr. Scherr had lost on that issue, if the court had said, "We find there was a contractual

relationship between Mr. Scherr and the Gillespie intervenors or some of the Gillespie intervenors," then that case would have become developed, potentially, to the extent that the Beard case was, wouldn't it?

MR. DARNELL: Object to form.

A. Well, you'd have a whole new set of cases then. In that situation the case within a case would be what the entire class action would be worth, not what Beard's case was worth or those individual chiropractors' cases. You'd have to then determine how the class as a whole was damaged because you have the case certified.

I mean, that's a different, totally different, situation. And once it's certified, you're looking at all the different -- every chiropractor in the state of Texas, who I think they were trying to include in the class. So if those were the people that were going to be all the plaintiffs, your damages would be different, and how that would play out I'm not sure at this point.

- Q. (By Mr. Hayes) Well, how would Mr. Scherr be any more responsible for that than Ms. Georges who was a lawyer representing putative class members?
- A. Good point. Because she's the one that dismissed the entire action as I understand it.
  - Q. Do you -- have you been requested -- if this

matter is tried before a jury, have you been asked to come to El Paso --

- A. No.
- Q. -- and try the case?
- A. No.

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- Q. Or participate in the trial?
- A. I spoke to Mr. Darnell, I believe, one time about this case when he called me and I told him that you and I were going to meet for an hour or so before the deposition and I said he's invited to come down. The have not talked to him any more. Everything you've heard from me you heard -- he's hearing for the first time today probably.
- Q. You missed the import of my question.
- 15 A. Yeah.
- 16 Q. I'm not suggesting --
- 17 A. I have not --
- 18 | Q. -- you've had any --
- 19 A. I have not been asked to come to trial.
- 20 Q. Okay. He just said, "I reserve my questions."
- 21 A. Yeah.
- Q. And as lawyers we understand that normally means that I'll ask my questions later when you're sitting there at trial.
- 25 | A. Okay.

Q. And I just want to know whether or not if the matter's tried at trial you, as you sit here today, have a present intention of getting on an airplane and flying out to El Paso and testifying live in front of the jury or whether that's something you haven't even thought about because nobody's asked you.

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A. Nobody's asked me. I haven't thought about it. But I will tell you this. Mr. Scherr and I had a pretty good relationship in -- during the course of the trial. And he ended up hiring our firm subsequent to the actual trial, even though we had lost the case, you know, so I felt like we had a good rapport. And so, we were going to go forward and if we would have had to, we would have tried the other case and we handled that other case all the way up on appeal. He paid my fees as we sent them to him.

So, I mean, I wouldn't say that if Mr.

Scherr asked me if I would fly out to El Paso to be a witness in this case that I wouldn't do it. I would probably do it. I mean, I don't see any reason why I wouldn't.

Same way if The Home Insurance asked me to fly up to Oklahoma and testify in a case that somehow they felt I needed to be involved in I would do it for them because I did a lot of work with The Home Insurance

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for over a period of years so --
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        Ο.
              Okay.
              -- that's sort of my answer, you know.
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        Α.
              I think I understand.
        Ο.
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        Α.
              Yeah.
                   MR. HAYES: I don't have any further
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    questions.
                   MR. DARNELL: Me neither.
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                   THE WITNESS: Good.
                   THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record at
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    six minutes after 12:00 p.m.
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                   (Discussion off the record.)
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                   MR. HAYES: By agreement of counsel, No. 3
    will be withdrawn, will be retained by Mr. Hayes and
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    provided to Mr. Darnell upon reasonable notice.
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                   THE WITNESS: That's good.
                  MR. HAYES: How does that sound?
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                  And then what we'll do is you can send
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    that back to me.
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                  MR. DARNELL: Okay.
                   (Deposition concluded at 12:07 p.m.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF EL PASO COUNTY, TEXAS
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                     205TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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    JAMES F. SCHERR,
        Plaintiff,
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                                      Cause No. 98-377
    v.
    THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY,
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        Defendant.
 7
                     REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
 8
       ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF DONALD M. HUDGINS
                         OCTOBER 22, 2002
 9
                 I, Michele W. Kuhlmann, a Certified
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    Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Texas, hereby
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    certify to the following:
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                That the witness, DONALD M. HUDGINS, was
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    duly sworn by the officer and that the transcript of the
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    oral deposition is a true record of the testimony given
    by the witness;
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                That examination and signature of the
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    witness to the deposition transcript was waived by the
    witness and agreement of the parties at the time of the
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    deposition;
                That the original deposition was delivered
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22
    to Mr. Burgain G. Hayes;
23
                That the amount of time used by each party
24
    at the deposition is as follows:
                Mr. Burgain G. Hayes - 1 hour, 43 minutes
25
```

Mr. Jim Darnell - 1 minute 1 That \$ 65.55 is the deposition officer's 2 charges to the Defendant for preparing the original 3 deposition transcript and any copies of exhibits; 4 That pursuant to information given to the 5 deposition officer at the time said testimony was taken, 6 7 the following includes counsel for all parties of record: 8 Mr. Jim Darnell, Attorney for Plaintiff; 9 Mr. Burgain G. Hayes, Attorney for Defendant. 10 That a copy of this certificate was served 11 on all parties shown herein on ( total 1920) and filed 12 with the Clerk pursuant to Rule 203.3. 13 I further certify that I am neither counsel 14 15 for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties or attorneys in the action in which this proceeding was 16 17 taken, and further that I am not financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. 18 Certified to by me this day of 19 rec , 2002. 20 21 Vickele W. Kuhlmann 22 MICHELE W. KUHLMANN, CSR CSR No. 2414, Exp. 12/31/03 23 Independent Reporting, Inc. 13105 N.W. Freeway, Suite 105 24 Houston, Texas 77040 25 (281) 469-5580